In his first public speech as president at the Building of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) of the Republic of Indonesia, Prabowo expressed his views on democracy, stating, “Kita menghendaki demokrasi, tapi marilah kita sadar bahwa demokrasi kita harus demokrasi yang khas Indonesia, demokrasi yang cocok untuk bangsa kita” (We desire democracy, but let us be aware that our democracy must be distinctly Indonesian, a democracy that suits our nation” (kompas.com, 10/20/2025).
He further added, “Demokrasi kita harus demokrasi yang santun, demokrasi di mana berbeda pendapat harus tanpa permusuhan, demokrasi di mana mengoreksi harus tanpa caci maki, bertarung tanpa membenci, bertanding tanpa berbuat curang” (Our democracy must be a courteous democracy, a democracy where differences of opinion do not lead to hostility, where criticism comes without insult, where we contend without hatred, and compete without cheating).
Prabowo’s perspective on democracy does not contradict liberal democracy, which he and many Indonesians believe is primarily associated with developed Western countries. However, the concept of ‘being polite’ is debatable, as it varies from country to country and even within Indonesia itself. For instance, the Javanese interpret politeness differently from people from Sumatra or the Pacific region. Even within Java, individuals in East Java have different views from those in Central Java and Yogyakarta. Therefore, Prabowo’s understanding of democracy remains a subject of contention.
Asian Values
Prabowo’s view on democracy aligns with what Lee Kuan Yew and others refer to as “Asian Values.” These values were formally articulated during a declaration at the World Conference on Human Rights in April 1993 in Bangkok, attended by several East and Southeast Asian countries, including China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore.
The fundamental claim of Asian values is that Asia has its own cultural values that differ significantly from Western ideals. Western liberal democracy is seen as prioritizing individual rights, personal interests, freedom of expression, competition, disagreement, democratic norms, secularism, the oversight and challenge of elected officials, separation of political administration from the market, individual autonomy, hedonism, and a relaxed lifestyle (Milner, 1999).
In contrast, Asian culture emphasizes community interests, social responsibility, order and harmony, consensus, economic prosperity, and developmentalism. It also integrates religion into daily life, respects political leadership, merges state and market activities, promotes family loyalty, encourages saving, thrift, and hard work (Subramaniam, 2000). In summary, liberal democracy stems from Western culture, leading to the conclusion that democracy cannot simply be applied in the same way in Asia (Robison, 1996).
Contesting Asian Values
Several studies by prominent Asian scholars challenge the notion of “Asian values,” with Amartya Sen’s work (1997) being particularly influential. Sen argues that the relationship between economic performance and political rights is complex and that the values of personal freedom and equality of freedom are universal. He contends that these values underlie human rights and are present across all cultures.
According to Sen, proponents of Asian values, such as Lee Kuan Yew, perceive Asia as a monolithic entity, which is fundamentally incorrect. Asia is home to diverse religions and cultures, each offering different values to its people. Furthermore, the concept of Asian values is more of a political agenda rather than a reflection of the genuine values held by Asian individuals.
Francis Fukuyama presents other counterarguments against the claims of Asian values. He asserts that the narrative suggesting a singular societal ethos in Asia is misleading. Fukuyama emphasizes the diversity within Confucian thought across various Asian contexts. In China, the communist-authoritarian regime often conflicts with Confucian principles that stress the importance of family over the state. Conversely, Japan’s interpretation prioritizes societal interests, sometimes at the expense of familial concerns.
Fukuyama argues that Confucianism and democracy can coexist for three main reasons. Firstly, both traditional and modern Chinese educational systems are grounded in a Confucian meritocratic examination process, allowing individuals from various backgrounds to compete for opportunities. Secondly, Confucianism emphasizes the importance of education, which aligns with the democratic need for an informed citizenry capable of making collective decisions. Lastly, the relative tolerance inherent in Confucianism has historically allowed for the coexistence of various religious and ethical systems.
A study by Chong-Min Park and Doh Chull Shin (2006) empirically investigates whether Confucian Asian values are incompatible with liberal democracy in South Korea. Their multivariate analysis reveals that not all Asian values correlate equally with support for pro-democratic or anti-authoritarian regimes. The relationship between Asian values and regime support is highly complex. While values such as social hierarchy, anti-pluralism, family-state dynamics, and moral-state perspectives do not influence democratic support, they do negatively affect the rejection of authoritarianism.
Russell Dalton and Nhu-Ngoc Ong (2005) examine whether Asian values are antithetical to liberal democracy by comparing six Confucian countries (China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam) with four Western democracies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States). Their findings indicate that democratic values like political equality, elite accountability, and pluralism are prevalent in places like Hong Kong and Taiwan. Surprisingly, even within the People’s Republic of China, these democratic norms are becoming increasingly common.
The study also shows that national levels of authority orientation in East Asia are not strongly linked to a Confucian heritage and are not markedly different from those of Western democracies in the Pacific Rim. The democratic process among citizens in East Asia does not significantly differ from that in established Western democracies. Notably, majorities in Vietnam (62%), Japan (62%), and South Korea (58%) express favorable views toward democracy.
Democracy is not exclusive to any one country; it can evolve in various contexts. England, once a monarchy like other Western European nations, and Germany, which historically resisted liberal democracy, have both come to embrace democratic values.
The key takeaway from these studies is that the concept of “Asian values” is largely political propaganda rather than a reflection of genuine cultural uniqueness. Indonesian-style democracy is just a myth. Instead of promoting democracy, Prabowo is not ready to welcome democratic challenges during his five-year administration.
