Prabowo’s assertion and the widespread belief among Indonesians that Indonesian democracy differs from Western democracies must be challenged. This claim is not only false but also lacks any academic foundation and is misleading.
From its inception, Indonesia was established as a democratic nation by its founding fathers. However, they never specified what kind of democracy they envisioned. It was Soekarno who proposed Pancasila as the philosophical foundation of the country. Subsequently, various scholars attempted to explain Pancasila academically, linking it to democracy. Consequently, we often accept that Indonesian democracy is a Pancasilaist democracy.
However, within just a few years, Soekarno declared an authoritarian government, which he termed “Demokrasi Terpimpin” (guided democracy). This authoritarian style used democracy as a facade, and no country embodies such a model of democracy. This indicates that Soekarno may have viewed Pancasila differently than democracy itself.
Soeharto continued this authoritarian trend in a more sultanistic, personal, and militaristic manner. He declared Pancasila to be the sole principle (asas tunggal) that should be upheld in Indonesia, which served his authoritarian agenda (Cribb & Brown, 1995).
After Soeharto’s fall and the advent of Reformasi, people celebrated the promise of democracy. This era was perceived as an opportunity for democratization, especially through decentralization, which was never designed or implemented as it should have been (Hadiz, 2004; 2011; Robison & Hadiz, 2014).
Nevertheless, Reformasi and decentralization have not led to true democracy. Megawati secured her presidential seat through relaxing on vertical accountability, while SBY formed a broad, non-traditional coalition that embraced all state agencies and civil organizations. This political strategy has since been employed by Jokowi and Prabowo to maintain their administrations and power (Mietzner, 2023, 2025; Slater,2024; Pepynsky, 2024).
Democracy has been repeatedly infringed upon by both elites and the populace. Research by Aspinall and Warburton reveals that the majority of Indonesians desire a strong, powerful, and militaristic leader rather than a democratic one. Indonesians tend to prioritize developmentalism over freedom of expression and favor consensus over dissent (Warburton & Aspinall, 2019).
We also observe resistance to liberal democracy due to misconceptions that intertwine religious moralism with politics. Many Indonesians believe that liberal democracy would lead to an individualistic society where people act solely based on self-interest, rather than understanding that democracy is meant to protect individuals from state paternalism and the tyranny of the majority.
Jokowi’s administration is undemocratic
The trends outlined above are prominently reflected in Jokowi’s administration, which is characterized by a significant erosion of democratic principles in Indonesia.
First, there are violations of fair and free elections. Current threats to democracy often go unnoticed, despite the periodic elections that fail to be genuinely free and competitive (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019). The parliamentary threshold restricts the entry of new political parties, and in the 2024 presidential election, President Jokowi is obstructing the participation of rival candidate Anies Baswedan (Scott, 2024). Additionally, money politics, bolstered by elites and oligarchs, further undermine democracy by prioritizing elite interests over genuine voter preferences (Diprose et al., 2019; Mietzner, 2024).
Second, civil and political rights are increasingly under threat. Attacks on minority groups are often overlooked by the state (komnasham.go.id, March 2023), and the right to free expression is heavily restricted (Safenet, March 2023). Jokowi has employed cyber troops to spread disinformation, which contributes to public mistrust and further fragments the information landscape (Mietzner, 2020).
Third, there is a notable trend of anti-pluralism. Jokowi employs authoritarian tactics against groups he labels as extremist, dismantling organizations without proper judicial oversight (Kompas.com, December 2020). He represses movements deemed threatening, including leftist organizations and NGOs (Mietzner, 2020; Fossati, 2024).
Fourth, the executive branch shows illiberal traits. Jokowi’s government increasingly utilizes state resources and law enforcement to secure electoral victories, particularly in 2019 and 2024, by criminalizing political rivals and manipulating opposition parties (Hadiprayitno, 2024; Mietzner, 2020). Furthermore, he has leveraged institutions such as the Election Committee and the Military to ensure favorable outcomes in elections (Faisal Uncensored, 2024; Mietzner, 2025a). Despite facing setbacks in regional elections, the concentration of executive power poses a significant threat to democracy (Mietzner, 2020; Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019).
Lastly, there are significant violations of vertical accountability. Elected officials often operate under the influence of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), which pressures the government to incorporate its fatwas into law and collaborates with extremist groups to target non-Muslims (Schäfer, 2019). The government has refrained from disbanding MUI due to its considerable religious and political influence (Fossati, 2024).
In summary, the indicators of illiberal democracy in Indonesia include violations of free elections, restrictions on political and civil rights, a lack of accountability, authoritarian anti-pluralism, and collusion between elites and extremist organizations. Without addressing these issues, Indonesia cannot be considered a true democracy.
