President Prabowo Subianto has once again positioned himself as a heroic figure by granting rehabilitation to former ASDP executives Ira Puspadewi, Yusuf Hadi, and Harry Muhammad Adhi Caksono. These individuals were convicted in a corruption case related to ASDP’s partnership with PT Jembatan Nusantara between 2019 and 2022.
Instead of allowing legal institutions to function independently, Prabowo has intervened as their rescuer. Notably, similar to Hasto Kristiyanto’s amnesty and Tom Lembong’s abolition, the announcement of this rehabilitation was made by Deputy Speaker Sufmi Dasco Ahmad rather than by the president himself.
This emerging pattern indicates a calculated political strategy. Why does Prabowo wait until these individuals are already incarcerated before stepping in? Additionally, why does Sufmi Dasco consistently act as the spokesperson? These actions suggest a broader strategy as Prabowo prepares for the 2029 election.
Setting up the stage for the 2029 election
Prabowo and Sufmi’s actions appear to be laying the groundwork for all Gerindra candidates running in the 2029 election. This might seem unlikely, as no single party or coalition has secured victory solely by backing a presidential-vice presidential candidate from the same party since Suharto’s fall.
The significant challenge they face may come from elite oligarchs who do not want to see Indonesia revert to a sultanistic and personalist authoritarianism reminiscent of Suharto’s era. However, elite-oligarch collusion is always benefit oriented, supporting candidates who have a better chance of winning. As long as Prabowo, Sufmi, and Gerindra can boost their electability to secure victory, they can ensure the backing of the elite oligarchs.
Every legal favor Prabowo offers helps to expand his coalition of gratitude, attracting electorates who previously aligned with PDIP and the Anies camp. This strategy weakens potential challengers while strengthening Gerindra as the dominant electoral vehicle.
By issuing legal rehabilitation for Ira and others, Prabowo continues to bolster his position by securing the full support of the people. The narrative he is constructing is clear: Prabowo presents himself as a benevolent leader who forgives, unifies, and restores dignity to individuals when the justice system seemingly fails them.
Simultaneously, Sufmi Dasco’s prominent presence indicates that Prabowo is grooming him as a key figure in Gerindra—possibly preparing him for a future presidential candidacy. This potential scenario is feasible for several reasons.
Firstly, if Prabowo consolidates power during his term, Gerindra will benefit from the substantial financial and institutional resources that come with executive control. Secondly, being president in Indonesia carries significant power, and, as seen in Jokowi’s administration, the president receives full support from the police, military, election commission, and other state agencies.
Thirdly, unlike Jokowi, who has channeled power to his family and subsequently monopolized power and business networks, Prabowo seems determined to promote loyal party figures rather than take a dynastic approach. This contrast enhances his image as a statesman. It is crucial for Prabowo to position himself as morally superior to Jokowi, whose dynasty-building efforts have tarnished his political legacy.
Lastly, Prabowo utilizes mercy and political reconciliation to gain public support, effectively transforming public frustration with Jokowi into greater backing for his own leadership. Additionally, undermining Jokowi serves as a medium-term strategy to diminish Gibran’s potential as a contender in the 2029 presidential election.
Undermining democracy
There is a concerning undercurrent beneath Prabowo’s strategy. While his actions seem to reflect the public’s desire for justice, they set a dangerous precedent in which a president can override legal processes at will. As Prabowo normalizes the use of presidential authority to manipulate judicial outcomes, Indonesia risks drifting toward executive aggrandizement—where the rule of law is no longer supreme and bends to a leader’s personal judgment.
Prabowo’s approach, despite any legal justifications, pushes Indonesia closer to a monarchy or a personalist autocracy rather than maintaining a democratic system. What may appear as compassion today could serve as a justification for authoritarian power tomorrow.
The country faces the danger of moving away from a democratic system rooted in the rule of law toward a governance model resembling a monarchy, where the ruler’s wishes supersede legal principles. This shift is likely to be exacerbated by the widespread misunderstanding among many Indonesians about the true nature of democracy (Aspinall & Warbartun, 2019) and the global trend of democratic decline (Diamond, 2015).
No potential challenger
At present, there are no viable challengers to Prabowo, Sufmi, and Gerindra for the 2029 election. PDIP, which has traditionally provided intense competition, has lost substantial support among its constituents, especially after Prabowo granted amnesty to Hasto. The same applies to Anies Baswedan, whose supporters may consider voting for Prabowo following the abolition granted to Tom Lembong.
Additionally, Gibran, lacking both resources and legitimacy, is unlikely to pose a significant challenge. Meanwhile, Prabowo continues to cultivate a public image as the nation’s protector—granting clemency, reconciling political adversaries, and delivering “justice” where the system is perceived to fail.
However, resistance is beginning to emerge. Civil society concerns are intensifying, especially as the military increasingly encroaches into civilian affairs under Prabowo’s leadership. The coming years will determine whether this growing alarm transforms into organized opposition or whether Indonesia accepts a leader who redefines the boundaries of presidential power.
The strongest way to challenge Prabowo in the 2029 election is to expose his vulnerabilities—specifically, his obsession with militarism, weak public participation in policymaking, policy failures, and corruption within his inner circle. However, this strategy is challenging because these issues are primarily recognized by educated groups and pro-democracy activists, who remain a minority. Given Prabowo’s increasing dominance, institutions such as the anti-corruption commission, the police, and the attorney general are unlikely to take action against him or his allies without his approval or pressure from the justice commission.
Ultimately, politics offers no certainties. Power shifts, alliances can crumble, and new figures can rise. Nonetheless, one thing is clear at this moment: Prabowo is benefiting from Jokowi’s blunders again and transforming it into unprecedented political capital.
